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Abstract
This article introduces the idea that probabilistic reasoning (PR) may
be understood as information compression by multiple alignment, uni-
fication and search (ICMAUS). In this context, multiple alignment has
a meaning which is similar to but distinct from its meaning in bio-
informatics, while unification means a simple merging of matching pat-
terns, a meaning which is related to but simpler than the meaning of that
term in logic.
A software model, SP61, has been developed for the discovery and
formation of ‘good’ multiple alignments, evaluated in terms of information
compression. The model is described in outline.
Using examples from the SP61 model, this article describes in outline
how the ICMAUS framework can model various kinds of PR including:
PR in best-match pattern recognition and information retrieval; one-step
‘deductive’ and ‘abductive’ PR; inheritance of attributes in a class hier-
archy; chains of reasoning (probabilistic decision networks and decision
trees, and PR with ‘rules’); geometric analogy problems; nonmonotonic
reasoning and reasoning with default values; modelling the function of a
Bayesian network.
Key Words: Probabilistic reasoning; multiple alignment; unification; in-
formation compression.
Category: SD I.2.3.
1 Introduction
Quoting Benjamin Franklin (“Nothing is certain but death and taxes”), Gins-
berg [Ginsberg 94, p. 2] writes that: “The view that Franklin was expressing
∗Published in the Journal of Universal Computer Science 5 (7), 418–462, 1999.
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is that virtually every conclusion we draw [in reasoning] is an uncertain one.”
He goes on to say: “This sort of reasoning in the face of uncertainty ... has ...
proved to be remarkably difficult to formalise.”
This article introduces the idea that probabilistic reasoning (PR) may be
understood as a process of information compression (IC) by multiple alignment
with unification and search (ICMAUS). The article is intended as a summary
or overview of research which is described in more details elsewhere [Wolff 98a,
Wolff 98b, Wolff 98c]. In the space available, it is only possible to present a
sketch of the main ideas. Many details are omitted and there is only brief
discussion of assumptions and related issues.
In the ICMAUS framework, multiple alignment (MA) has a meaning which
is similar to but distinct from its meaning in bio-informatics while unification
means a simple merging of matching patterns, a meaning which is related to but
simpler than the meaning of that term in logic. The term search in this context
means the systematic exploration of the abstract space of possible alignments,
normally constrained in some way (using heuristic techniques or otherwise) to
achieve useful results in realistic timescales.
In this article, the way in which the IC associated with any alignment may
be calculated is described in outline together with a brief description of SP61,
a software model designed to discover and construct MAs which are ‘good’ in
terms of IC. More detail may be found in [Wolff 98a, Wolff 98b, Wolff 98c].
With examples from the SP61 model, the main body of the article presents
an overview of how the ICMAUS framework can accommodate a variety of kinds
of PR including:
• Best-match pattern recognition and information retrieval.
• Inheritance of attributes in a class hierarchy.
• One-step ‘deductive’ and ‘abductive’ reasoning.
• Chains of reasoning:
– Reasoning with probabilistic decision networks and decision trees.
– Reasoning with ‘rules’.
• Reasoning with default values.
• Nonmonotonic reasoning.
• Solving geometric analogy problems.
• ICMAUS as a possible alternative to Bayesian networks.
Topics which are discussed in [Wolff 98b] but are omitted from this arti-
cle include: recognition of patterns with internal structure (illustrated with
an example of medical diagnosis); multiple inheritance; and the recognition of
polythetic categories. Topics which are discussed in [Wolff 98c] but omitted here
include: modelling of ‘variables’ with ‘values’ and ‘types’; hypothetical (“what
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if”) reasoning; indirection in information retrieval; and the representation of
knowledge in the ICMAUS framework.
For the sake of clarity and to save space, the examples presented in Section
5 and the following sections are relatively small. However, the SP61 model is
capable of handling more complicated examples as can be seen in [Wolff 98b,
Wolff 98c, Wolff 98d1]. The scaling properties of the model are good (see Section
3.4.1).
1.1 Background and context
The proposals in these articles have been developed within a programme of
research developing the ‘SP’ conjecture that:
All kinds of computing and formal reasoning may usefully be under-
stood as information compression by multiple alignment, unification
and search,
and developing a ‘new generation’ computing system based on this thinking. 1
Background thinking for this research programme is described in [Wolff 93]
and [Wolff 95a]. In addition to PR, the concepts have so far been developed
in relation to the following fields: best-match information retrieval and pattern
recognition [Wolff 94a]; parsing of natural language [Wolff 98d1]; and automation
of software design and the execution of software functions [Wolff 94b].
Although the ICMAUS framework has not yet been developed for learning,
the entire programme of research is based on earlier research on unsupervised
inductive learning [Wolff 91, Wolff 88, Wolff 82] which is itself based on prin-
ciples of Minimum Length Encoding (MLE2, see [Cheeseman 90, Pednault 91,
Rissanen 78, Solomonoff 64, Wallace and Boulton 68, Li and Vita´nyi 97]). A
preliminary account of the ICMAUS framework and its range of applications in
learning and reasoning was presented in [Wolff 96c] at a stage before a working
model had been developed or the concepts had been quantified.
It has been argued [Wolff 98e] that the ICMAUS framework provides an
interpretation in terms of IC of the Post Canonical System and Universal Turing
Machine models of computing.
1.1.1 Research on probabilistic reasoning
There is now a huge literature on PR and related ideas ranging over ‘standard’
parametric and non-parametric statistics; ad hoc uncertainty measures in early
expert systems; Bayesian statistics; Bayesian/belief/causal networks; Markov
networks; Self-Organising Feature Maps; fuzzy set theory and ‘soft’ computing’;
1IC may be interpreted as a process of removing unnecessary (redundant) complexity in
information - and thus maximising simplicity - whilst preserving as much as possible of its
non-redundant descriptive power. Hence the name ‘SP’ applied to the central conjecture and
other aspects of this research.
2MLE is used here as an umbrella term for Minimum Message Length encoding and Min-
imum Description Length encoding.
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the Dempster-Shaffer theory; abductive reasoning; nonmonotonic reasoning and
reasoning with default values; autoepistemic logic, defeasible logic, probabilis-
tic, possibilistic and other kinds of logic designed to accommodate uncertainty;
MLE; algorithmic probability and algorithmic complexity theory; truth main-
tenance systems; decision analysis; utility theory; and so on.
A well-known authoritative survey of the field, with an emphasis on Bayesian
networks, is provided by Judea Pearl [Pearl 88] although this book is now,
perhaps, in need of some updating. A useful review from the same year is
[Grunwald 97].
A more recent collection of articles, which together provide a broad
coverage of the subject, appears in [Gabbay et al. 94]. A relatively short
but useful review of “uncertainty handling formalisms” is provided by
[Parsons and Hunter 98]. Regarding the application of different kinds of ‘logic’
to nonmonotonic and uncertain reasoning, there is a mine of useful information
in the articles in [Gabbay et al. 94] covering such things as ‘default logic’, ‘au-
toepistemic logic’, ‘circumscription’, ‘defeasible logic’, ‘uncertainty logics’ and
‘possibilistic logic’. In that volume, the chapter by Ginsberg [Ginsberg 94] pro-
vides an excellent introduction to the problems of nonmonotonic reasoning.
Papers by [Cussens and Hunter 92, Bondarenko et al. 97, Kern-Isberner 98,
Kohlas et al. 98, Schaub and Bruning 98, Schurz 98] are also relevant as are the
papers in [Gammerman 96].
1.1.2 Information compression and probabilistic reasoning
Naturally enough, much of the literature on probabilistic reasoning deals di-
rectly with concepts of probability, especially conditional probability. Since,
however, there is a close connection between probability and compression (me-
diated by coding schemes such as the Huffman coding scheme - see, for example,
[Cove and Thomas 91] - or the Shannon-Fano-Elias coding scheme, ibid.), con-
cepts of probability imply corresponding concepts of compression.
That said, a primary emphasis on compression rather than probability pro-
vides an alternative perspective on the subject which may prove useful. Rele-
vant sources include [Cussens and Hunter 92, Dagu and Luby 97, Grunwald 97,
Grunwald 98, Li and Vita´nyi 97, Schaub and Bruning 98, van der Gaag 96] and
[Watanabe 72].
2 Multiple alignment problems
The term multiple alignment is normally associated with the computational
analysis of (symbolic representations of) sequences of DNA bases or sequences of
amino acid residues as part of the process of elucidating the structure, functions
or evolution of the corresponding molecules. The aim of the computation is to
find one or more alignments of matching symbols in two or more sequences
which are, in some sense, ‘good’. Possible meanings for that term are discussed
4
G G A G C A G G G A G G A T G G G G A
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
G G | G G C C C A G G G A G G A | G G C G G G A
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
A | G A C T G C C C A G G G | G G | G C T G G A | G A
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
G G A A | A G G G A G G A | A G G G G A
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
G G C A C A G G G A G G C G G G G A
Figure 1: A ‘good’ alignment amongst five DNA sequences (adapted from Fig. 6 in
[Roytberg 92], with permission from Oxford University Press).
in Section 3.3, below. An example of an alignment of DNA sequences is shown
in Figure 1.
In this area of research, it is widely recognised that the number of possible
alignments of symbols is normally too large to be searched exhaustively and
that, to achieve a search which has acceptable speed and acceptable scaling
properties, ‘heuristic’ techniques must normally be used. Heuristic techniques
include ‘hill climbing’ (sometimes called ‘descent’), ‘beam search’, ‘genetic algo-
rithms’, ‘simulated annealing’, ‘dynamic programming’ and others. With these
techniques, searching is done in stages, with a progressive narrowing of the
search in successive stages using some kind of measure of goodness of align-
ments to guide the search. These techniques may be described generically as
‘metrics-guided search’.
With these techniques, ideal solutions cannot normally be guaranteed but
acceptably good approximate solutions can normally be found without excessive
computational demands.
There is now a fairly large literature about methods for finding good align-
ments amongst two or more sequences of symbols. Some of the existing methods
are reviewed in [Barton 90, Chan et al. 92, Day and McMorris 92, Taylor 88].
Because of the way in which the concept of MA has been generalised in this
research (see next), none of the current methods for finding MAs are suitable
for incorporation in the proposed SP system. Hence the development of a new
method, outlined in Section 2.1.
2.1 Generalisation of the concept of multiple alignment
In this research, the concept of MA has been generalised in the following way:
1. One (or more) of the sequences of symbols to be aligned has a special
status and is designated as ‘New’. The way in which the concept of ‘New’
appears to relate to established concepts in computing is shown in Table
1.
2. All other sequences are designated as ‘Old’. The way in which the concept
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of ‘Old’ appears to relate to established concepts in computing is also
shown in Table 1.
3. A ‘good’ alignment is one which, through the unification of symbols in
New with symbols in Old, and through unifications amongst the symbols
in Old, leads to a relatively large amount of compression of New in terms
of the sequences in Old. How this may be done is explained in Section
3.3, below.
4. An implication of this way of framing the alignment problem is that,
by contrast with ‘multiple alignment’ as normally understood in bio-
informatics, any given sequence in Old may appear two or more times
in any one alignment and may therefore be aligned with itself (with the
obvious restriction that any one instance of a symbol may not be aligned
with itself).3
It should be clear that this concept of MA (and the bio-informatics ver-
sion of the concept) may be generalised to two-dimensional (or even higher-
dimensional) patterns. There is likely to be a case, at some stage in the SP
research programme, for extending the ideas described in this article into the
domain of two or more dimensions.
3 The ICMAUS framework
The main concepts to be presented can probably best be described with reference
to a simple example. Since ‘parsing’ in the sense understood in theoretical
linguistics and natural language processing has come to be a paradigm for the
several concepts to be described, it will provide our first example despite the
fact that, when the input sentence or phrase to be parsed is complete, there
is no significant PR as understood in this article. Sections 3.1 and 3.2 show
how the parsing of a very simple sentence with a very simple grammar may be
understood as MA. Much more elaborate examples can be found in [Wolff 98d1].
3.1 Representing a grammar with patterns of symbols
Figure 2 shows a simple context-free phrase-structure grammar (CF-PSG) de-
scribing a fragment of the syntax of English. This grammar generates the four
sentences ‘j o h n r u n s’, ‘j o h n w a l k s’, ‘s u s a n r u n s’, and ‘s u s a n w
3With the kind of MA shown in Figure 1, it is obviously possible to include two or more
copies of a given sequence in any one alignment. To my knowledge, this is never done in
practice because it would simply lead to the trivial alignment of each symbol in one copy
with the corresponding symbol or symbols in one or more other copies. What is proposed for
the ICMAUS framework is different: any one pattern may appear two or more times in an
alignment. Each appearance is just that - it is an appearance of one pattern, not a duplicate
copy of a pattern. Since each appearance of a pattern represents the same pattern, it makes
no sense to match a symbol from one appearance with the corresponding symbol in another
appearance because this is simply matching one instance of the symbol with itself. Any such
match is spurious and must be forbidden.
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Area of New Old
application
Unsupervised ‘Raw’ data. Grammar or other
inductive learning knowledge structure
created by learning.
Parsing The sentence The grammar used for
to be parsed. parsing.
Pattern A pattern to be The stored knowledge
recognition recognised used to recognise
and scene or scene to be one pattern or several
analysis analysed. within a scene.
Databases A ‘query’ in SQL or Records stored
other query language. in the database.
Expert A ‘query’ in the The ‘rules’ or other
system query language for knowledge stored in
the expert system. the expert system.
Computer The ‘data’ or The computer program
program ‘parameters’ itself.
supplied to the
program on each run.
Table 1: The way in which the concepts of ‘New’ and ‘Old’ in this research appear to
relate to established concepts in computing.
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S -> N V
N -> j o h n
N -> s u s a n
V -> w a l k s
V -> r u n s
Figure 2: A CF-PSG describing a fragment of English syntax.
a l k s’. Any of these sentences may be parsed in terms of the grammar, giving
a labelled bracketing like this:
(S(N j o h n)(V r u n s))
or an equivalent representation in the form of a tree.
Figure 3 shows the grammar from Figure 2 expressed as a set of strings,
sequences or patterns4 of symbols. Each pattern in this ‘grammar’ is like a
re-write rule in the CF-PSG notation except that the rewrite arrow has been
removed, some other symbols have been introduced (‘0’, ‘1’ and symbols with
an initial ‘#’ character) and there is a number to the right of each rule.5,6,7
The number to the right of each rule in Figure 3 is an imaginary frequency of
occurrence of the rule in a parsing of a notional sample of the language. These
frequencies of occurrence will be discussed later.
The reasons for the symbols which have been added to each rule will become
clear but a few words of explanation are in order here. The symbols ‘0’ and ‘1’
have been introduced to differentiate the two versions of the ‘N’ patterns and
the two versions of the ‘V’ patterns. They enter into matching and unification
4In this programme of research, the term pattern means an array of symbols in one or
more dimensions. This includes arrays in two or more dimensions as well as one-dimensional
sequences. Although one-dimensional sequences will be the main focus of our attention in this
article, the term pattern will be used as a reminder that the concept of multiple alignment in
this research includes alignments of patterns in two or more dimensions. Formal definitions
of terms like pattern and symbol are provided in Appendix A1 of [Wolff 98a].
5For the remainder of this article, quote marks will be dropped when referring to any
grammar like that in Figure 3 which is expressed as patterns of symbols. Likewise, the word
‘rule’ with respect to this kind of grammar will be referred to without quote marks.
6This example of a grammar and how it is used in parsing may give the impression
that the ICMAUS framework is merely a trivial variation of familiar concepts of context-
free phrase-structure grammar (CF-PSG) with their well-known inadequacies for representing
and analysing the ‘context sensitive’ structures found in natural languages. The examples
presented in [Wolff 98d1] show that the ICMAUS framework is much more ‘powerful’ than
CF-PSGs and can accommodate quite subtle context-sensitive features of natural language
syntax in a simple and elegant manner. Achieving this expressive power with a relatively
simple notation is made possible by the relatively sophisticated search processes which lie at
the heart of the SP model.
7For the sake of clarity in exposition and to save space, all the grammars shown in this
article are much simpler than in any practical system. For similar reasons, all examples of
MAs which are presented have been chosen so that they are small enough to fit on one page
without resorting to font sizes which are too small to read. However, for the reasons given
in Section 3.4.1, the model appears to be general and scalable to realistically large knowledge
structures and alignments.
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S N #N V #V #S (1000)
N 0 j o h n #N (300)
N 1 s u s a n #N (700)
V 0 w a l k s #V (650)
V 1 r u n s #V (350)
Figure 3: A simple grammar written as patterns of symbols. For each rule, there is a
number on the right representing the frequency of occurrence of the rule in a notional
sample of the language.
in exactly the same way as other symbols. Although the symbols are the same
as are used in other contexts to represent numbers they do not have the meaning
of numbers in this grammar.
The symbols which begin with ‘#’ (e.g., ‘#S’, ‘#NP’) serve as ‘termination
markers’ for patterns in the grammar. Although their informal description
as ‘termination markers’ suggests that these symbols are meta symbols with
special meaning, they have no hidden meaning and they enter into matching
and unification like every other symbol.
In general, all the symbols which can be seen in Figure 3 enter into matching
and unification in the same way. Although some of these symbols can be seen to
serve a distinctive role, there is no hidden meaning attached to any of them; and
there is no formal distinction between upper- and lower-case letters or between
digit symbols and alphabetic symbols - and so on.8
3.2 Parsing as an alignment of a sentence and rules in a
grammar
Figure 4 shows how a parsing of the sentence ‘j o h n r u n s’ may be seen as an
alignment of patterns which includes the sentence pattern and other patterns
from the grammar shown in Figure 3.
The similarity between this alignment and the conventional parsing may be
seen if the symbols in the alignment are ‘projected’ on to a single sequence,
thus:
S N 0 j o h n #N V 1 r u n s #V #S.
In this projection, the two instances of ‘N’ in the second column of the
alignment have been merged or ‘unified’, and likewise for the two instances of
‘#N’ in the eighth column, and so on wherever there are two or more instances
of a symbol in any column.
8The foregoing assertions are not strictly true of the method of evaluating alignments which
is used in the SP61 model. The principle of “no meta symbols” and thus “no hidden meanings
for symbols” is an ideal which this research aims to attain. But, as a temporary solution to
the problem of scoring alignments in the SP61 model, pending something better, a distinction
has been recognised between symbols which begin with ‘#’ and all other symbols (details of
the scoring method are presented in Section 4 of [Wolff 98a]).
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0 j o h n r u n s 0
| | | | | | | |
1 N 0 j o h n #N | | | | 1
| | | | | |
2 S N #N V | | | | #V #S 2
| | | | | |
3 V 1 r u n s #V 3
Figure 4: Parsing of the sentence ‘j o h n r u n s’ as an alignment amongst sequences
representing the sentence and relevant rules in the grammar in Figure 3.
This projection is the same as the conventional parsing except that ‘0’ and
‘1’ symbols are included, right bracket symbols (‘)’) are replaced by ‘termination
markers’ and each left bracket is replaced by an upper-case symbol which may
also be regarded as a ‘label’ for the structure.
As was noted in Section 2.1, the sentence or other sequence of symbols to be
parsed is regarded as New, while the rules in the grammar are regarded as Old.
For the sake of readability and ease of interpretation, New is normally placed
at the top of each alignment with patterns from Old below it.
For the sake of clarity in Figure 4 and other alignments shown later, each
appearance of a pattern in any alignment is given a line to itself. Apart from the
convention that New is always at the top, the order in which patterns appear
(from top to bottom of the alignment) is entirely arbitrary. An alignment in
which the patterns appear in one order is entirely equivalent to an alignment in
which they appear in any other order, provided all other aspects of the alignment
are the same.
3.3 Evaluation of an alignment in terms of IC
What is the difference between a ‘good’ alignment and a ‘bad’ one? Intuitively, a
good alignment is one which has many hits (positive matches between symbols),
few gaps (sequences of one or more symbols which are not part of any hit) and,
where there are gaps, they should be as short as possible.
It is possible to use measures like these directly in computer programs for
finding good MAs and, indeed, they commonly are. However, our confidence
in the validity of measures like these may be increased if they can be placed
within a broader theoretical framework. Concepts of information, IC, and re-
lated concepts of probability provide a suitable framework. Work on the evalua-
tion of MAs in this tradition includes [Allison and Wallace 94, Allison et al. 92,
Chan et al. 92, Felsenstein 81, Reichert et al. 73, Wolff 94a].
As was indicated in Section 2.1, a good alignment is defined here as one
which provides a basis for an economical coding of New in terms of the patterns
Old. There is no space here to describe in detail the method of evaluation which
is used in the ICMAUS framework and in SP61. The outline description here
should give readers an intuitive grasp of the method. A much fuller description
may be found in Section 4 of [Wolff 98a].
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At the most fine-grained level in an alignment like the one shown in Figure
4, individual symbols may be encoded using Huffman coding or Shannon-Fano-
Elias (S-F-E) coding (see [Cove and Thomas 91]) to take advantage of variations
in the frequencies of symbol types.
For individual words in New, patterns like those shown in Figure 3 provide
suitable codes. Thus, for the example shown in Figure 4, ‘j o h n’ may be
encoded with the symbols ‘N 0 #N’ and ‘r u n s’ may be encoded with ‘V 1
#V’. If ‘j o h n r u n s’ were encoded purely at the level of words, the result
would be ‘N 0 #N V 1 #V’ which is not much shorter (in numbers of symbols)
than the original sentence. However, we can take advantage of the fact that
within the pattern ‘N 0 #N V 1 #V’, there is a subsequence ‘N #N V #V’
and this subsequence is encoded at a ‘higher’ level by the pattern for a whole
sentence, ‘S N #N V #V #S’.
In order to exploit this higher level encoding, we first add the symbols ‘S’
and ‘#S’ (representing the sentence pattern) to the word-level encoding giving
‘S N 0 #N V 1 #V #S’. Then we extract the subsequence ‘N #N V #V’ (which
is implied by the symbols ‘S’ and ‘#S’, representing a sentence) so that the net
result is ‘S 0 1 #S’. It should be clear that, in the context of the grammar shown
in Figure 3, these four symbols unambiguously encode the original sentence, ‘j
o h n r u n s’. In terms of numbers of symbols (and in terms of the numbers of
bits, calculated by SP61), this is substantially shorter than the original.
This idea of using ‘higher level’ patterns to encode the codes from ‘lower
level’ patterns may be applied recursively through any number of levels. More
realistic examples may be found in [Wolff 98d1].
The method used in SP61 for calculating a measure of the compression
associated with any alignment delivers a value called a compression difference
(CD). This is the size of New without any compression minus the size of New
after it has been encoded in terms of the alignment.
3.4 The SP61 model
There is no space here to present anything more than a general description of
the SP61 model. A summary of the organisation of the model is presented
in [Wolff 98a]. SP61 is similar to the SP52 model described quite fully in
[Wolff 98d1]. The main difference between SP61 and the earlier model is that
SP61 has been generalised to calculate probabilities of inferences. In addition,
a fairly large number of minor refinements have been made.
At the heart of both models is a process for finding alignments between two
patterns which are ‘good’ in terms of IC. An early version of this method for
aligning two patterns is described in [Wolff 95b] and a more refined version in
[Wolff 94a].
The process may be regarded as a form of dynamic programming (see, for
example, [Sankoff and Kruskall 83]) but it differs from standard methods in
three main ways:
• It can find alternative alignments between two patterns, graded in terms
11
of compression.
• It exploits list processing techniques so that arbitrarily long patterns may
be compared (within the limits of the host machine).
• The thoroughness of searching, and thus the computational resources
which are required (computing time or memory size or both), may be
controlled with parameters.
For each pattern in New (and there is normally only one), this process is
applied initially to compare the pattern in New with all the patterns in Old.
From amongst the alignments which are found, the best ones are ‘unified’ to
convert the alignment into a single sequence or pattern of symbols. This pattern
is stored together with the alignment from which it was derived. Any alignments
which cannot be unified in this way are discarded.
For each pattern amongst the best of the unified alignments just formed,
the process is repeated, the best alignments are unified to form simple patterns
and these patterns (with their alignments) are stored as before. This cycle is
repeated in the same way until no more alignments can be found.
3.4.1 Computational complexity
Given that all the example grammars in this article are smaller than would
be required in any realistic system, and given the well-known computational
demands of multiple alignment problems, readers may reasonably ask whether
the proposed framework for parsing would scale up to handle realistically large
knowledge structures and patterns in New.
The time complexity of the SP52 model in a serial processing environment
has been estimated to be approximately O(log2n ·nm), where n is the length of
the sentence and m is the sum of the lengths of the patterns in Old [Wolff 98d1].
The same estimate is valid for the SP61 model. In a parallel processing environ-
ment, the time complexity of the models may approach O(log2n ·n), depending
on how the parallel processing is applied. In serial or parallel environments, the
space complexity should be O(m).
In summary, there is reason to think that the method of forming align-
ments which is embodied in SP61 will not lead to running times or demands for
storage which are hopelessly impractical when the this approach is applied to
realistically large examples.
3.4.2 Alignments with one-dimensional patterns
As was indicated in Section 2.1, it is envisaged that the ICMAUS concepts
will, at some stage, be generalised to accommodate patterns in two or more
dimensions. However, at present, the SP52 and SP61 models are restricted to
one-dimensional patterns.
One consequence of this restriction is that it is necessary, with any given
alignment, to be able to ‘project’ it into a single sequence as was shown in
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Section 3.2. This can only be done if the left-right position of every symbol in
the alignment is unambiguous. With alignments like these:
a b a b
| | | |
a x b and a b x
| | | |
a y b a b y
the relative left-right positions of ‘x’ and ‘y’ are not defined which means that
the alignments cannot be projected into a single sequence. In the SP52 and
SP61 models, all such alignments are ‘illegal’ and are discarded.
When the models are generalised to handle patterns in two (or more) di-
mensions, there should be some relaxation in the restriction just described. For
example, if the left-right position of ‘x’ and ‘y’ is undefined in a time dimension,
it should still be possible to accept the alignment provided that ‘x’ and ‘y’ were
at two different positions in a spatial dimension.
Another possible way to avoid this restriction might be to generalise the
models so that, when appropriate, the symbols in each pattern may be treated as
an unordered collection or ‘bag’. Since order is no longer significant, alignments
like the ones shown above should be legal. No attempt has yet been made to
generalise the models in this way.
4 Probabilistic reasoning, multiple alignment
and information compression
What connection is there between the formation of an alignment, as described
in Section 3.2, and PR? This section describes the connection and describes in
outline how the probabilities of inferences may be calculated. A fuller presen-
tation, with more discussion of the method and the suppositions on which it is
based, may be found in [Wolff 98b].
In the simplest terms, PR arises from partial pattern recognition: if a pattern
is recognised from a subset of its parts (something that humans and animals
are very good at doing), then, in effect, an inference is made that the unseen
part or parts are ‘really’ there. We might, for example, recognise a car from
seeing only the front half because the rear half is hidden behind another car or
a building. The inference that the rear half is present is probabilistic because
there is always a possibility that the rear half is absent or, in some surreal world,
replaced by the front half of a horse, and so on.
In terms of multiple alignment, PR may be understood as the formation of an
alignment in which some part or parts of the patterns from Old which appear in
the alignment (single symbols, substrings or subsequences within patterns from
Old) are not aligned with any matching symbol or symbols from New. As a
working hypothesis, all kinds of PR may be understood in these terms.
What connection is there between the probability of any inferences which
may appear in an alignment and measures of compression for that alignment?
13
How can the probability of MA inferences be calculated? Answers to these two
questions are presented next. Although the example to be shown is simple,
the method to be outlined is general and may be applied to alignments of any
complexity.
4.1 Absolute probabilities of alignments and inferences
Any sequence of L symbols, drawn from an alphabet of |A| symbol types, rep-
resents one point in a set of N points where N is calculated as:
N = |A|L.
If we assume that the sequence is random or nearly so, which means that the N
points are equi-probable or nearly so, the probability of any one point (which
represents a sequence of length L) is reasonably close to:
pABS = |A|
−L.
This formula can be used to calculate the probability of a New sequence in
an alignment after it has been compressed in terms of the Old patterns in the
alignment: the formula is applied with the value of L being the length of the
New after encoding. In SP61, the value of |A| is 2.
If New is not completely matched by symbols in Old, we can use the formula
to calculate the probability of that substring or subsequence within New which
is matched to symbols in Old. This probability may also be regarded as a
probability both of the alignment and of any inferences (symbols from Old
which are not matched to New) within the alignment.
4.1.1 Is it reasonable to assume that New in encoded form is random
or nearly so?
Why should we assume that the code for an alignment is a random sequence
or nearly so? In accordance with Algorithmic Information Theory (see, for
example, [Li and Vita´nyi 97]), a sequence is random if it is incompressible. If
we have reason to believe that a sequence is incompressible or nearly so, then
we may regard it as random or nearly so.
Generally, we cannot prove for any given body of data that no further com-
pression is possible. But we may say that, with the methods we are currently us-
ing, and the resources we have applied, no further compression can be achieved.
In short, the assumption that the code for an alignment is random or nearly so
only applies to the best encodings found for a given body of information in New
and must be qualified by the quality and thoroughness of the search methods
which have been used to create the code.
4.2 Relative probabilities of alignments
The absolute probabilities of alignments, calculated as described in the last sub-
section, are normally very small and not very interesting in themselves. From
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the standpoint of practical applications, we are normally interested in the rela-
tive values of probabilities, not their absolute values.
A point we may note in passing is that the calculation of relative probabilities
from pABS will tend to cancel out any general tendency for values of pABS to
be too high or too low. Any systematic bias in values of pABS should not have
much effect on the values which are of most interest to us.
If we are to compare one alignment and its probability to another alignment
and its probability, we need to compare like with like. An alignment can have a
high value for pABS because it encodes only one or two symbols from New. It
is not reasonable to compare an alignment like that to another alignment which
has a lower value for pABS but which encodes more symbols from New. Conse-
quently, the procedure for calculating relative values for probabilities (pREL) is
as follows:
1. For the alignment which has the highest CD (which we shall call the
reference alignment), identify the symbols from New which are encoded
by the alignment. We will call these symbols the reference set of symbols
in New.
2. Compile a reference set of alignments which includes the alignment with
the highest CD and all other alignments (if any) which encode exactly the
reference set of symbols from New, neither more nor less.9
3. The alignments in the reference set are examined to find and remove any
rows which are redundant in the sense that all the symbols appearing in a
given row also appear in another row in the same order.10 Any alignment
which, after editing, matches another alignment in the set is removed from
the set.
4. Calculate the sum of the values for pABS in the reference set of alignments:
pA SUM =
i=R∑
i=1
pABSi
where R is the size of the reference set of alignments and pABSi is the
value of pABS for the ith alignment in the reference set.
5. For each alignment in the reference set, calculate its relative probability
as:
pRELi = pABSi/pA SUM .
9There may be a case for defining the reference set of alignments as those alignments which
encode the reference set of symbols or any super-set of that set. It is not clear at present
which of those two definitions is to be preferred.
10If Old is well compressed, this kind of redundancy amongst the rows of an alignment
should not appear very often.
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The values of pREL calculated as just described seem to provide an effective
means of comparing the alignments which encode the same set of symbols from
New as the alignment which has the best overall CD.
It is not necessary always to use the alignment with the best CD as the
basis of the reference set of symbols. It may happen that some other set of
symbols from New is the focus of interest. In this case a different reference set
of alignments may be constructed and relative values for those alignments may
be calculated as described above.
4.3 Relative probabilities of patterns and symbols
It often happens that a given pattern from Old or a given symbol type within
patterns from Old appears in more than one of the alignments in the reference
set. In cases like these, one would expect the relative probability of the pattern
or symbol type to be higher than if it appeared in only one alignment. To
take account of this kind of situation, SP61 calculates relative probabilities for
individual patterns and symbol types in the following way:
1. Compile a set of patterns from Old, each of which appears at least once
in the reference set of alignments.
2. For each pattern, calculate a value for its relative probability as the sum
of the pREL values for the alignments in which it appears. If a pattern
appears more than once in an alignment, it is only counted once for that
alignment.
3. Compile a set of symbol types which appear anywhere in the patterns
identified in 2.
4. For each symbol type identified in 3, calculate its relative probability as
the sum of the relative probabilities of the patterns in which it appears.
If it appears more than once in a given pattern, it is only counted once.
With regard to symbol types, the foregoing applies only to symbol types
which do not appear in New. Any symbol type which appears in New
necessarily has a probability of 1.0 - because it has been observed, not
inferred.
4.4 A simple example
In order to illustrate the kinds of values which may be calculated for absolute
and relative probabilities, this subsection presents a very simple example: the
inference of ‘fire’ from ‘smoke’. Here, we shall extend the concept of ‘smoke’
to include anything, like mist or fog, which looks like smoke. Also, ‘fire’ has
been divided into three categories: the kind of fire used to heat a house or other
building, dangerous fires that need a fire extinguisher or more, and the kind of
fire inside a burning cigarette or pipe. The alignment we are considering looks
like this:
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Patterns Frequency Encoding
cost (bits)
clouds black rain 15,000 2.93
dangerous fire smoke 500 7.84
heating fire smoke 7,000 4.03
tobacco fire smoke 10,000 3.52
fog smoke 2,000 5.84
stage smoke 100 10.16
thunder lightning 5,000 4.52
strawberries cream 1,500 6.26
Table 2: A small knowledge base of associations. The middle column shows an imag-
inary frequency of occurrence of each pattern in some notional reference environment.
The right-hand column shows the encoding cost of each pattern, calculated as de-
scribed in Section 4 of [Wolff 98d1].
smoke
|
fire smoke
Given the small knowledge base shown in Table 2 as Old, and a pattern
containing the single symbol ‘smoke’ as New, the frequency of occurrence and
the ‘minimum’ cost of each symbol type (calculated by SP61 using the method
described in Section 4 of [Wolff 98d1]) are shown in Table 3.
The encoding cost of each pattern is simply the sum of the minimum costs
of each of the minimum number of symbols from the pattern which are needed
to discriminate the pattern uniquely within Old (as described in Section 4 of
[Wolff 98d1]). In this example, every pattern can be identified uniquely by its
first symbol. Thus, in all cases, the encoding cost of each pattern (shown to the
right of Table 2) is the minimum cost of its first symbol.
Given that New is a pattern containing the single symbol ‘smoke’, SP61
forms the five obvious alignments of New with each of the patterns in Table 2
which contain the symbol ‘smoke’. The absolute and relative probabilities of
the five alignments, calculated as described above, are shown in Table 4.
In this very simple example, the relative probability of each pattern from Old
is the same as for the alignment in which it appears. However, the same cannot
be said of individual symbol types. The relative probabilities of the symbol
types that appear in any of the five reference alignments (shown in Table 4) are
shown in Table 5.
The main points to notice about the relative probabilities shown in Table 5
are:
• The relative probability of ‘smoke’ is 1.0. This is because it is a ‘fact’
which appears in New: hence there is no uncertainty attaching to it.
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Frequency Minimum
cost (bits)
smoke 19,601 2.55
black 15,000 2.93
clouds 15,000 2.93
cream 1,500 6.26
dangerous 500 7.84
fire 17,500 2.71
fog 2,000 5.84
heating 7,000 4.03
lightning 5,000 4.52
rain 15,000 2.93
stage 100 10.16
strawberries 1,500 6.26
thunder 5,000 4.52
tobacco 10,000 3.52
Table 3: The frequency of occurrence of each symbol type appearing in Table 2
(together with New which is a pattern containing the single symbol ‘smoke’) and the
minimum cost of each symbol type calculated by the method described in Section 4 of
[Wolff 98d1].
Absolute Relative
probability probability
smoke/tobacco fire smoke 0.08718 0.51020
smoke/heating fire smoke 0.06103 0.35714
smoke/fog smoke 0.01744 0.10204
smoke/dangerous fire smoke 0.00436 0.02551
smoke/stage smoke 0.00009 0.00510
Table 4: Absolute and relative probabilities of each of the five reference alignments
formed between ‘smoke’ in New and, in Old, the patterns shown in Table 2. In this
example, the relative probability of each pattern from Old is the same as the alignment
in which it appears.
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Relative
probability
smoke 1.00000
fire 0.89286
tobacco 0.51020
heating 0.35714
fog 0.10204
dangerous 0.02551
stage 0.00510
Table 5: The relative probabilities of the symbol types from Old that appear in any
of the reference set of alignments shown in Table 4.
• Of the other symbol types from Old, the one with the highest probability
relative to the other symbols is ‘fire’, and this relative probability is higher
than the relative probability of any of the patterns from Old (Table 4).
This is because ‘fire’ appears in three of the reference alignments.
In this example, we have ignored all the subtle cues that people would use
in practice to infer the origin of smoke: the smell, colour and volume of smoke,
associated noises, behaviour of other people, and so on. Allowing for this, and
allowing for the probable inaccuracy of the frequency values which have been
used, the relative probabilities of alignments, patterns and symbols seem to
reflect the subjective probability which we might assign to the five alternative
sources of smoke-like matter in everyday situations.
5 Best-match pattern recognition and informa-
tion retrieval
As was noted in Section 4, recognition of objects or patterns can entail PR
when a pattern is recognised from a subset of its parts. The same is true of
best-match information retrieval. In both cases, there can be errors of omission,
addition and substitution.
As an example of best-match pattern recognition (which may also be con-
strued as best-match information retrieval), consider the thoroughly mis-spelled
‘word’, ‘c m p u x t a r’ and how it may be matched against stored patterns.
Figure 5 shows the four alignments formed by SP61 which have the highest
CDs when this pattern was supplied as New and, in Old, a small dictionary
of 45 words prepared by selecting, in a more or less haphazard manner, one,
two or three words from each of the alphabetic sections of an ordinary English
dictionary. Each word was given a notional frequency of occurrence.
The first three alignments are, by far, the best matches for the given pattern.
They have CDs (from the top alignment downwards) of 41.39, 29.14 and 28.44.
The next best alignment is the fourth one shown in Figure 5, which has a CD of
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0 c m p u x t a r 0
| | | | | |
1 c o m p u t e r 1
(a)
0 c m p u x t a r 0
| | | | |
1 c o m m u t e r 1
(b)
0 c m p u x t a r 0
| | | | |
1 c o m m u t e r 1
(c)
0 c m p u x t a r 0
| | |
1 p a r a f f i n 1
(d)
Figure 5: The best four alignments formed by SP61 between ‘c m p u x t a r’ and
words in a small dictionary of 45 words. CD values for the four alignments are, from
the top down, 41.39, 29.14, 28.44 and 13.76.
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only 13.76. Notice that each of the first three alignments contain discrepancies
between ‘c m p u x t a r’ and the word to which it has been aligned which
represent all three of the possible kinds of discrepancy: omission, addition and
substitution of symbols.
Regarding probabilities, the absolute probability of the best alignment is
calculated by SP61 as 0.00652. Since there is no other alignment which contains
all and only the symbols ‘c’, ‘m’, ‘p’, ‘u’, ‘t’ and ‘r’ from New, the reference list
of alignments containing all and only the same symbols from New has only one
entry, and so the relative probability of the best alignment is 1.0.
In general, these results accord with our intuition that the ‘correct’ form of
‘c m p u x t a r’ is ‘c o m p u t e r’ and our intuition that ‘c o m m u t e r’ is a
very close alternative.
6 Inheritance of attributes in a class hierarchy
In describing objects, patterns or other entities it is often useful to assign them
to classes which may themselves be classified recursively through any number
of levels. This, of course, is the basis of object-oriented software and object-
oriented databases. The value of a classification system is that it saves repetition
of features which are the same in two or more entities. Many animals, for
example, have a backbone. If these animals are grouped into a class ‘vertebrates’
then the feature ‘backbone’ need only be recorded once in the description of the
class and it can then be inherited by members of the class without the need to
record it in each of the several descriptions of individual animals. This device
is a mechanism for information compression.
Figure 6 shows a set of patterns representing, in highly simplified form,
part of a class hierarchy for vertebrate animals. As in Figure 3, each pattern
is followed by a number in brackets which represents a notional frequency of
occurrence of the pattern in some domain.
The first pattern represents the class vertebrates and is mainly a framework
for lower-level classes. It provides empty slots for ‘name’, ‘head’, ‘legs’, ‘blood’
and others, while the slot for ‘body’ shows that each vertebrate has a backbone.
Below the pattern for vertebrates - lower on the page and lower in terms of
the class hierarchy - are patterns for reptiles, birds and mammals. Each one is
identified as a vertebrate and each one shows distinctive features for its class:
reptiles are cold-blooded, birds have feathers, and so on. In a similar way, three
subclasses of the class mammal are specified and, within one of those subclasses
(the class ‘carnivore’), there is a pattern for each of the classes ‘dog’ and ‘cat’. In
each case, the pattern for a given class is linked to its ‘parent’ class by inclusion
in the pattern of the name of the parent class.
Figure 7 shows the best alignment found by SP61 with the pattern ‘descrip-
tion name Tibs #name purrs #description’ in New and, in Old, the patterns
shown in Figure 6. Each of the symbols from Figure 6 has been abbreviated in
Figure 7 so that the alignment does not become too long to be shown easily on
a page.
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vertebrate description name #name head #head
body backbone #body
legs #legs blood #blood
covering #covering food #food
other_features #other_features
#description #vertebrate (104700)
vertebrate reptile description blood cold #blood
covering scaly #covering
#description #reptile #vertebrate (35000)
vertebrate bird description head beak #head
blood warm #blood
covering feathers #covering
#description #bird #vertebrate (40000)
vertebrate mammal description
blood warm #blood covering fur #covering
#description #mammal #vertebrate (29700)
mammal marsupial description
other_features born_small#other_features
#description #marsupial #mammal (700)
mammal cetacean description
other_features
fish_shape live_in_water
#other_features
#description #cetacean #mammal (15000)
mammal carnivore description food flesh_eating #food
#description #carnivore #mammal (1400)
carnivore cat description
other_features
retractile_claws purrs
#other_features
#description #cat #carnivore (600)
carnivore dog description
other_features barks #other_features
#description #dog #carnivore (800)
Figure 6: A set of patterns representing part of a class hierarchy of vertebrate animals,
much simplified. The number in brackets at the end of each pattern is a notional
frequency of occurrence of that pattern.
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0 dn ne Ts #ne 0
| | |
1 ve ml dn | | bld wm #bld 1
| | | | | | |
2 ve | dn ne #ne hd #hd by be #by ls #ls bld #bld 2
| |
3 ml ce dn 3
| |
4 ce ct dn 4
0 ps #dn 0
| |
1 cg fr #cg | #dn #ml #ve 1
| | | | | |
2 cg #cg fd #fd os | #os #dn | #ve 2
| | | | | | |
3 fd fg #fd | | | #dn #ce #ml 3
| | | | |
4 os rs ps #os #dn #ct #ce 4
Figure 7: The best alignment found by SP61 with ‘description name Tibs #name
purrs #description’ in New and the patterns shown in Figure 6 in Old. Names of
symbols (shown in Figure 6) have been shortened here to reduce the length of the
alignment. Key: be = backbone, bld = blood, by = body, ce = carnivore, cg =
covering, ct = cat, dn = description, fd = food, fg = flesh eating, fr = fur, hd = head,
ls = legs, ml = mammal, ne = name, os = other features, ps = purrs, ts = Tibs, ve
= vertebrate.
This alignment shows rather clearly how the ICMAUS framework allows
inferences to be drawn. With the patterns shown in Figure 6, the symbols in
New (particularly the symbol ‘purrs’) imply that the animal is a cat (which
means that it has retractile claws), that it is a carnivore (which means that it
is flesh-eating), that it is a mammal (which means that it is warm blooded and
covered in fur), and that it is a vertebrate and therefore has a backbone.
In this case, there is only one alignment that can match the same symbols
from New. In terms of those symbols, the relative probability of the alignment
- and thus the inferences which can be drawn from the alignment - is 1.0.
No attempt has been made here to show how the ICMAUS framework might
accommodate systems of classes with multiple-inheritance (cross classification).
Readers may like to think how this might be done.
The way in which ‘polythetic’ classes 11 may be represented and used in the
ICMAUS scheme is discussed in [Wolff 98b].
11A polythetic class is one in which there need not be any one attribute which is shared by
all members of the class.
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6.1 Inferences with less distinctive features
What happens if the symbols in New are not so distinctive for one of the lowest-
level classes? SP61 has been run with the same patterns in Old but with the
pattern ‘description name Tibs #name flesh eating #description’ in New. In
this case, the program forms three alignments which match with all the symbols
in New (except ‘Tibs’). The best one in terms of compression is like the align-
ment in Figure 7 except that it does not include a pattern for the class ‘cat’. In
effect, it identifies the unknown animal as a carnivore without specifying what
kind of carnivore. The other two alignments are the same except that, in addi-
tion, one contains the pattern for ‘dog’ and the other contains the pattern for
‘cat’.
The SP61 program calculates relative probabilities for the three alignments
as 0.915, 0.062 and 0.023, respectively. From these values, the program calcu-
lates probabilities for individual patterns and symbols in the alignments.
Since the pattern for ‘carnivore’ appears in all three alignments, its proba-
bility is calculated as the sum of the three relative probabilities - which is 1.0.
Likewise for the patterns for ‘mammal’ and ‘vertebrate’. However, the pattern
for ‘dog’ appears in only one of the three alignments so the probability is the
same as the relative probability for that alignment: 0.062. In a similar way, the
probability for the pattern for ‘cat’ is 0.023. Similar calculations are made for
symbols in the alignments.
The probability value of 1.0 for ‘carnivore’, ‘mammal’ and ‘vertebrate’ re-
flects our intuition that, in terms of the patterns in Old, the unknown animal
is certainly a carnivore and also a mammal and a vertebrate. But the relative
probabilities for ‘dog’ and ‘cat’ seem rather low.
A possible refinement of the method of calculating probabilities might be for
the system to recognise that the first alignment is contained within each of the
second and third alignments so that a relative probability may be calculated for
each of the second and third alignments, in each case excluding the probability
of the first alignment. If the calculations are done in this way, the relative
probability of ‘dog’ would be 0.729 and the relative probability of ‘cat’ would
be 0.271. These values accord much better with our intuitions.
7 One-step ‘deductive’ reasoning
Consider a ‘standard’ example of modus ponens syllogistic reasoning:
1. ∀x: bird(x) ⇒ canfly(x).
2. bird(Tweety).
3. ∴ canfly(Tweety).
which, in English, may be interpreted as:
1. If something is a bird then that something can fly.
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2. Tweety is a bird.
3. Therefore, Tweety can fly.
In strict logic, a ‘material implication’ like (p⇒ q) (“If something is a bird
then that something can fly”) is equivalent to (¬q⇒¬p) (“If something cannot
fly then it is not a bird”) and also to (¬p⇒ q) (“Either something is not a bird
or it can fly”).
However, there is a more relaxed, ‘everyday’ kind of ‘deduction’ which, in
terms of our example, may be expressed as: “If something is a bird then, prob-
ably, it can fly. Tweety is a bird. Therefore, probably, Tweety can fly.”
This kind of probabilistic ‘deduction’ differs from strict material implication
because it does not have the same equivalencies as the strict form. If our focus
of interest is in describing and reasoning about the real world (rather than
exploring the properties of abstract systems of symbols), the probabilistic kind
of ‘deduction’ seems to be more appropriate. With regard to birds, we know
that there are flightless birds, and for most other examples of a similar kind, an
“all or nothing” logical description would not be an accurate reflection of the
facts.
With a pattern of symbols, we may record the fact that birds can fly and,
in a very natural way, we may record all the other attributes of a bird in the
same pattern. The pattern may look something like this:
bird name #name canfly wings feathers beak
crop lays_eggs ... #bird
or the attributes of a bird may be described in the more elaborate way described
in Section 6.
This pattern and others of a similar kind may be stored in ‘Old’, together
with patterns like ‘name Tweety #name’, ‘name Tweety #name’, ‘name Susan
#name’ and so on which define the range of possible names. Also, the pattern,
‘bird Tweety’, corresponding to the proposition “Tweety is a bird” may be
supplied as New. Given patterns like these in New and Old, the best alignment
found by SP61 is the one shown in Figure 8.
As before, the inferences which are expressed by this alignment are rep-
resented by the unmatched symbols in the alignment. The fact that Tweety
is a bird allows us to infer that Tweety can fly but it also allows us to infer
that Tweety has wings, feathers and all the other attributes of birds. These
inferences arise directly from the pattern describing the attributes of birds.
There is only one alignment which encodes all the symbols in New. There-
fore, the relative probability of the alignment is 1.0, the relative probability of
‘canfly’ is 1.0, and likewise for all the other symbols in the alignment, both those
which are matched to New and those which are not.12
12At this point readers may wonder whether the ICMAUS scheme can handle nonmonotonic
reasoning: the fact that additional information about penguins, kiwis and other flightless birds
would invalidate the inference that something being a bird means that it can fly. Discussion
of this point is deferred until Section 11
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0 bird Tweety 0
| |
1 | name Tweety #name 1
| | |
2 bird name #name canfly wings feathers beak 2
0 0
1 1
2 crop lays_eggs ... #bird 2
Figure 8: The best alignment found by SP61 with the pattern ‘bird Tweety’ in New
and other patterns in Old as described in the text.
8 Abductive reasoning
In the ICMAUS framework, any subsequence of a pattern may function as what
is ‘given’ in reasoning, with the complementary subsequence functioning as the
inference. Thus, it is just as easy to reason in a ‘backwards’, abductive manner
as it is to reason in a ‘forwards’, deductive manner. We can also reason from
the middle of a pattern outwards, from the ends of a pattern to the middle,
and many other possibilities. In short, the ICMAUS framework allows seamless
integration of probabilistic ‘deductive’ reasoning with abductive reasoning and
other kinds of reasoning which are not commonly recognised.
Figure 9 shows the best alignment and the other member of its reference set
of alignments which are formed by SP61 with the same patterns in Old as were
used in the example of ‘deductive’ reasoning (Section 7) and with the pattern
‘Tweety canfly’ in New.
By contrast with the example of ‘deductive’ reasoning, there are two align-
ments in the reference set of alignments that encode all the symbols in New.
These two alignments represent two alternative sets of abductive inferences that
may be drawn from this combination of New and Old.
With regard to the first alignment (Figure 9 (a)), ‘Tweety’ could be a bird
with all the attributes of birds, including the ability to fly. The relative probabil-
ity of the alignment is 0.8, as is the relative probability of the pattern for ‘bird’
and every other symbol in that pattern (apart from the ‘name’ and ‘#name’
symbols where the relative probability is 1.0).
Alternatively, we may infer from the second alignment (Figure 9 (b)) that
‘Tweety’ could be a bat. But in this case the relative probability of the align-
ment, the pattern for ‘bat’ and all the symbols in that pattern (apart from the
‘name #name’ symbols) is only 0.2.
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0 Tweety canfly 0
| |
1 name Tweety #name | 1
| | |
2 bird name #name canfly wings feathers beak 2
0 0
1 1
2 crop lays_eggs ... #bird 2
(a)
0 Tweety canfly 0
| |
1 name Tweety #name | 1
| | |
2 bat name #name fur canfly eats_insects ... #bat 2
(b)
Figure 9: The best alignment and the other member of its reference set of alignments
which are formed by SP61 with patterns as described in Section 7 in Old and ‘Tweety
canfly’ in New.
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Start 1 Does the starter turn the engine? (3600)
1 yes 2 Does the starter turn the engine briskly? (2400)
2 yes 6 Does the engine start? (1900)
6 yes 10 Does the engine run smoothly? (700)
10 yes 14 Engine is OK. (500)
10 no 12 Replace the carburettor. (200)
6 no 11 Is there fuel in the tank? (1200)
11 yes 12 Replace the carburettor. (300)
11 no 13 Put fuel in the tank. (900)
2 no 15 Is the battery flat? (500)
15 yes 4 Recharge or replace the battery. (400)
15 no 16 Replace the starter motor. (100)
1 no 3 Is the battery flat? (1200)
3 yes 4 Recharge or replace the battery. (800)
3 no 5 Are there good electrical connections? (400)
5 yes 8 Are the spark plugs OK? (300)
8 yes 17 Replace the starter motor. (100)
8 no 18 Replace the spark plugs. (200)
5 no 9 Repair the electrical connections. (100)
Figure 10: A set of patterns representing a highly simplified decision network for the
diagnosis of faults in car engines. As in other examples of patterns in this paper, each
pattern has a notional frequency of occurrence which is shown in brackets at the end of
the pattern. The English text associated with each pattern is not part of the patterns
as they are supplied to SP61.
9 Reasoning with probabilistic decision net-
works and decision trees
Figure 10 shows a set of patterns which, in effect, represent a (highly simpli-
fied) decision network for the diagnosis of faults in car engines. As with other
sets of patterns shown in this paper, each pattern has a notional frequency of
occurrence shown in brackets at the end of the pattern. The patterns supplied
to SP61 do not include the English text shown in the figure.
It should be clear that patterns like the ones shown in Figure 10 may be used
to represent either a decision network or a decision tree. The set of patterns in
the figure correspond very largely to a tree structure but, strictly speaking, the
structure is a network because terminal node 12 can be reached via two different
paths, and likewise for terminal node 4.
Figure 11 shows the best alignment formed by SP61 with the pattern ‘Start
no no yes no’ in New (representing a sequence of yes/no decisions in the network)
and, in Old, the patterns shown in Figure 10 (without the English text). The
key inference we can make from this alignment is the numerical identifier ‘18’
at the extreme right of the figure. This corresponds to the advice “Replace the
spark plugs”.
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0 Start no no yes no 0
| | | | |
1 Start 1 | | | | 1
| | | | |
2 1 no 3 | | | 2
| | | |
3 3 no 5 | | 3
| | |
4 5 yes 8 | 4
| |
5 8 no 18 5
Figure 11: The best alignment formed by SP61 with the pattern ‘Start no no yes no’
in New and the patterns shown in Figure 10 in Old (without the English text).
Since there is only one alignment which matches all the symbols in New, the
probability of the inference in this case is 1.0. If the sequence of symbols in New
is incomplete in some way, e.g., the last symbol (‘no’) is missing, the program
delivers a set of alternative alignments with probabilities less than 1.0 in much
the same way as in the example discussed in Section 5.
9.1 So what?
Regarding the example in Figure 11, readers may object that ICMAUS is a
long-winded way to achieve something which is done perfectly adequately with a
conventional expert system or even a conventional chart on paper. Has anything
been gained by re-casting the example in an unfamiliar form?
The main reason for including the example in this article is to show that
multiple alignment as it has been developed in the ICMAUS framework has a
much broader scope than may, at first sight, be assumed. However, one possible
advantage of using the ICMAUS framework is that it is generic for several
different kinds of PR and so can promote the integration of decision networks
and trees with other kinds of PR.
Another possible response to the “So what?” question is that the ICMAUS
framework, unlike most conventional discrimination nets or discrimination trees,
does not depend exclusively on input which is both complete and accurate. It
can bridge gaps in information supplied to it (as New) and can compensate for
symbols which have been added or substituted in the input, provided there are
not too many. There is an example with discussion in [Wolff 98b].
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10 Reasoning with ‘rules’
The rules in a typical expert system express associations between things in
the form ‘IF condition THEN consequence (or action)’. As we saw with the
example in Section 4.4, we can express an association quite simply as a pattern
like ‘fire smoke’ without the need to make a formal distinction between the
‘condition’ and the ‘consequence’ or ‘action’. And, as we saw in Sections 7 and
8, it is possible to use patterns like these quite freely in both a ‘forwards’ and a
‘backwards’ direction. As was noted in Section 8, the ICMAUS framework allows
inferences to be drawn from patterns in a totally flexible way: any subsequence
of the symbols in a pattern may function as a condition, with the complementary
subsequence as the corresponding inference.
It is easy to form a chain of inference like “If A then B, if B then C” from
patterns like ‘A B’ and ‘B C’. But if the patterns are ‘A B’ and ‘C B’, the
relative positions of ‘A’ and ‘C’ in the alignment are undefined as described in
Section 3.4.2. This means that, with the SP52 or SP61 models, the alignment
is treated as being illegal and is discarded. Generalisations of the models as
described in Section 8 would probably provide a solution to this problem but
these generalisations have not yet been attempted.
A way round this problem which can be used with the current models is
to adopt a convention that the symbols in every pattern are arranged in some
arbitrary sequence, e.g., alphabetical, and to include a ‘framework’ pattern and
some additional ‘service’ symbols which together have the effect of ensuring
that every symbol type always has a column to itself. This avoids the kind
of problem described above and allows patterns to be treated as if they were
unordered associations of symbols.
Figure 12 shows a small set of patterns representing well-known associations
together with one pattern (‘3 destroy 4 10 the barn 11’) representing the fact
that ‘the barn’ has been destroy(ed) and a framework pattern (‘1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
9 10 11’) as mentioned above. In every pattern except the last, the alphabetic
symbols are arranged in alphabetical order. Every alphabetical symbol has its
own slot in the framework, e.g. ‘black-clouds’ has been assigned to the position
between the service symbols ‘1’ and ‘2’. Every alphabetical symbol is flanked
by the service symbols representing its slot.
Figure 13 shows the best alignment found by SP61 with the pattern ‘accused
petrol smoke the-barn’ in New and the patterns from Figure 12 in Old. The
pattern in New may be taken to represent the key points in an allegation that
an accused person has been seen with petrol near ‘the-barn’ (which has been
destroyed) and that smoke was seen at the same time.
The alleged facts about the accused person do not, in themselves, show that
he/she is guilty of arson. For the jury to find the accused person guilty, they
must understand the connections between the accused person, petrol, smoke and
the destruction of the barn. With this example, the inferences are so simple (for
people) that the prosecuting lawyer would hardly need to spell them out. But
the inferences still need to be made.
The alignment shown in Figure 13 may be interpreted as a piecing together
30
4 fire 5 8 smoke 9 (500)
3 destroy 4 fire 5 (100)
4 fire 5 matches 6 petrol 7 (300)
1 black-clouds 2 7 rain 8 (2000)
1 black-clouds 2 cold 3 9 snow 10 (1000)
3 destroy 4 10 the-barn 11 (1)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 (7000)
Figure 12: Patterns in Old representing well-known associations, together with one
‘fact’ (‘3 destroy 4 10 the-barn 11’) and a ‘framework’ pattern (‘1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
11’) as described in the text.
0 accused petrol smoke the-barn 0
| | |
1 4 fire 5 matches 6 petrol 7 | | 1
| | | | | | |
2 3 destroy 4 fire 5 | | | | 2
| | | | | | | | |
3 1 2 3 | 4 | 5 6 7 8 | 9 10 | 11 3
| | | | | | | | | | |
4 3 destroy | | | | | | 10 the-barn 11 4
| | | | | |
5 4 fire 5 8 smoke 9 5
Figure 13: The best alignment formed by SP61 with a pattern in New representing
allegations about someone accused of arson and patterns in Old as shown in Figure
12.
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of the argument that the petrol, with matches or something similar (that were
not seen), was used to start a fire (which was not seen either), and that the
fire explains why smoke was seen and why the barn was destroyed. Of course,
in a more realistic example, there would be many other clues to the existence
of a fire (e.g., charred wood) but the example, as shown, gives an indication
of the way in which evidence and inferences may be connected together in the
ICMAUS paradigm.
11 Nonmonotonic reasoning and reasoning with
default values for variables
The concepts of monotonic and nonmonotonic reasoning are well explained by
[Ginsberg 94]. In brief, conventional deductive inference is monotonic because,
as your set of beliefs grows, so does the set of conclusions that can be drawn from
those beliefs. The deduction that “Socrates is mortal” from the propositions
that “All humans are mortal” and “Socrates is human” remains true for all time
and cannot be invalidated by anything we learn later. By contrast, the inference
that “Tweety can probably fly” from the propositions that “Most birds fly” and
“Tweety is a bird” is nonmonotonic because it may be changed if, for example,
we learn that Tweety is a penguin (unless he/she is an astonishing new kind of
penguin that can fly).
This section presents some simple examples which suggest that the ICMAUS
framework may provide a ‘home’ for nonmonotonic reasoning. No attempt is
made to address the several problems associated with nonmonotonic reasoning
which are described in [Ginsberg 94].
11.1 Typically, birds fly
Figure 14 shows a set of patterns like the patterns describing animals that we
saw in Figure 6 but adapted to illustrate nonmonotonic reasoning. The main
points to notice in this connection are that the set of patterns includes one
for the class ‘bird’ and one each for ‘swallow’ and ‘penguin’. Also, the set of
patterns in Figure 14 contains the pattern ‘bird canfly yes #canfly #bird ’.
This last-mentioned pattern provides a ‘default value’ for the variable ‘canfly
#canfly’ in the class ‘bird’. The context ‘bird ... #bird ’ is included in the pat-
tern so that the default value applies only to birds and allows for the possibility
that a different default value for the same variable might apply in the case of,
say, insects.
The pattern ‘bird canfly yes #canfly #bird’ may be interpreted as a state-
ment that “Typically, birds fly”. It should not be interpreted as the universally-
quantified statement that “All birds fly” because, as will be seen below, it can
be over-ridden in much the same way as default values in conventional systems.
Elsewhere [Wolff 98d1] I have discussed how a universal truth may be ex-
pressed using patterns. In brief, the pattern ‘bird canfly yes #canfly #bird’
should be removed from Old and the pattern defining the class birds should
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bird description
name #name
structure
wings #wings
feathers beak crop
#structure
function canfly #canfly lays_eggs #function
#description #bird (30000)
bird swallow description
wings pointed #wings
canfly yes #canfly
#description #swallow #bird (700)
bird penguin description
wings stubby #wings
canfly no #canfly
#description #penguin #bird (400)
bird canfly yes #canfly #bird (15000)
name Tweety #name (300)
name John #name(500)
name Tibby #name (400)
Figure 14: A set of patterns to illustrate nonmonotonic reasoning.
be augmented so that ‘canfly #canfly’ within the pattern becomes ‘canfly yes
#canfly’.
11.2 Tweety is a bird so, probably, Tweety can fly
Figure 15 shows, at the top, the best alignment found by SP61 with the pattern
‘bird Tweety’ in New and the patterns from Figure 14 in Old. Below this
alignment, in descending order of CDs, are the other alignments in the reference
set. Relative probabilities of these alignments are shown in the caption to the
figure.
The first alignment, which has by far the highest relative probability, tells us
that, as a bird, Tweety almost certainly has wings, feathers, beak and a crop. In
itself, this alignment does not tell us whether or not Tweety can fly. This accords
with a ‘strict’ interpretation of the statement “Tweety is a bird”: because of
the existence of flightless birds as well as birds that fly, this statement, in itself,
does not tell us whether or not Tweety can fly.
However, the second alignment tells us, without supposing that Tweety is
any particular type of bird, that it is more likely than anything else that Tweety
can fly.
The last alignments in Figure 15 tell us that, in order of probability and
within the limits imposed by the system’s store of knowledge, Tweety could be
a swallow or a penguin. The alignments predict that, in the first case, Tweety
would be able to fly, but not if he/she were a penguin.
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0 bd Twy 0
| |
1 bd dn ne | #ne se ws #ws fs bk cp #se fn cy #cy ls #fn #dn #bd 1
| | |
2 ne Twy #ne 2
(a)
0 bd Twy 0
| |
1 bd dn ne | #ne se ws #ws fs bk cp #se fn cy #cy ls #fn #dn #bd 1
| | | | | | |
2 bd | | | cy ys #cy #bd 2
| | |
3 ne Twy #ne 3
(b)
0 bd Twy 0
| |
1 bd sw dn | ws pd #ws cy ys #cy 1
| | | | | | |
2 bd dn ne | #ne se ws #ws fs bk cp #se fn cy #cy 2
| | |
3 ne Twy #ne 3
0 0
1 #dn #sw #bd 1
| |
2 ls #fn #dn #bd 2
3 3
(c)
0 bd Twy 0
| |
1 bd pn dn | ws sy #ws cy no #cy 1
| | | | | | |
2 bd dn ne | #ne se ws #ws fs bk cp #se fn cy #cy 2
| | |
3 ne Twy #ne 3
0 0
1 #dn #pn #bd 1
| |
2 ls #fn #dn #bd 2
3 3
(d)
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Figure 15: (This figure appears on the previous page.) At the top of the figure, the
best alignment found by SP61 for the pattern ‘bird Tweety’ in New with the patterns
from Figure 14 in Old. Below that alignment, in descending order of CD values, are
the other alignments in the reference set of alignments. Key: bd = bird, bk = beak,
cp = crop, cy = canfly, dn = description, ee = eagle, fn = function, fs = feathers, ne
= name, ls = lays eggs, no = no, pd = pointed, pn = penguin, se = structure, sw
= swallow, sy = stubby, Twy = Tweety, ve = vertebrate, ws = wings, ys = yes. In
order from the top, the relative probabilities of these alignments are: 0.7636, 0.2094,
0.0172, and 0.0098.
11.3 Tweety is a penguin, so Tweety cannot fly
What happens if, when we have learned that Tweety is a bird and inferred that
he/she can probably fly, we are then told that Tweety is a penguin? How, in the
ICMAUS scheme, can we reason nonmonotonically, replacing our first inference
with the new inference that Tweety cannot fly?
We must suppose that the information that Tweety is a bird (‘bird Tweety’)
has been added to the patterns in Old which are shown in Figure 14. It is prob-
ably not appropriate to add anything to Old to say that Tweety can probably
fly because this is merely inference, not fact. There may very well be a case for
storing tentative inferences, and it seems likely that people do just that. But
the intention in the design of SP61 is that Old will be restricted to information,
in compressed or uncompressed form, which has, notionally at least, come from
New.
Figure 16 shows the reference set of two alignments found by SP61 with the
pattern ‘penguin Tweety’ in New and with Old augmented with ‘bird Tweety’
as just described. The first alignment tells us that Tweety is a bird that cannot
fly because he/she is a penguin. The other alignment is the same but includes
the pattern ‘bird Tweety’. Since both alignments tell us that Tweety cannot fly,
the probability of this conclusion is 1.0, very much what one would naturally
assume from the information that Tweety is a penguin.
Reasoning is nonmonotonic in this example because the previous conclusion
that Tweety could probably fly has been replaced by the conclusion that Tweety
cannot fly.
In this example, the formation of two alignments as shown in Figure 15 is
somewhat untidy. As we noted in Section 5, there is probably a case for refining
the system so that it can recognise when one alignment is contained within
another. In this case, alignment (a) is contained within alignment (b) and is, in
effect, a stepping stone in the formation of (b). There is a case for presenting
alignment (b) by itself as the best alignment.
12 Solving geometric analogy problems
Figure 17 shows an example of a well-known type of simple puzzle - a geometric
analogy problem. The task is to complete the relationship “A is to B as C is to
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0 pn Twy 0
| |
1 bd pn dn | ws sy #ws cy no #cy 1
| | | | | | |
2 bd dn ne | #ne se ws #ws fs bk cp #se fn cy #cy 2
| | |
3 ne Twy #ne 3
0 0
1 #dn #pn #bd 1
| |
2 ls #fn #dn #bd 2
3 3
(a)
0 pn Twy 0
| |
1 bd pn dn | ws sy #ws cy no #cy 1
| | | | | | |
2 bd dn ne | #ne se ws #ws fs bk cp #se fn cy #cy 2
| | | |
3 | ne Twy #ne 3
| |
4 bd Twy 4
0 0
1 #dn #pn #bd 1
| |
2 ls #fn #dn #bd 2
3 3
4 4
(b)
Figure 16: The best alignments found by SP61 with the pattern ‘penguin Tweety’ in
New and with the patterns from Figure 14 in Old, augmented with the pattern ‘bird
Tweety’. The abbreviations of symbols are the same as in Figure 15.
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CA
F
G
D
EB
?
Figure 17: A geometric analogy problem.
?” using one of the figures ‘D’, ‘E’, ‘F’ or ‘G’ in the position marked with ‘?’.
For this example, the ‘correct’ answer is clearly ‘E’.
What has this got to do with PR? This kind of problem may be seen as
an example of reasoning because it requires a process of “going beyond the
information given”. Is it probabilistic? In the example shown in Figure 17,
there seems to be only one ‘right’ answer which does not seem to leave much
room for probabilities less than 1.0. But with many problems of this type,
a case can be made for two or even more alternative answers and there is a
corresponding uncertainty about which answer is ‘correct’.
Computer-based methods for solving this kind of problem have existed for
some time (e.g., Evans’s well-known heuristic algorithm [Evans 68]). In recent
work [Belloti and Gammerman 96, Gammerman 91], MLE principles have been
applied to good effect. The proposal here is that, within the general framework
of MLE, this kind of problem may be understood in terms of ICMAUS.
As in some previous work [Belloti and Gammerman 96, Gammerman 91],
the proposed solution assumes that some mechanism is available which can
translate the geometric forms in each problem into patterns of alpha-numeric
symbols like the patterns in other examples in this article. For example, item
‘A’ in Figure 17 may be described as ‘small circle inside large triangle’.
How this kind of translation may be done is not part of the present pro-
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0 A small circle inside large triangle ; B large circle 0
| | | | |
1 C2 small square inside large ellipse ; E large square 1
0 above small triangle # 0
| | |
1 above small ellipse # 1
Figure 18: The best alignment found by SP61 for the patterns in New and Old as
described in the text.
posals (one such translation mechanism is described in [Evans 68]). As noted
elsewhere [Gammerman 91], successful solutions for this kind of problem require
consistency in the way the translation is done. For this example, it would be
unhelpful if item ‘A’ in Figure 17 were described as ‘large triangle outside small
circle’ while item ‘C’ were described as ‘small square inside large ellipse’. For
any one puzzle, the description needs to stick to one or other of “X outside Y”
or “Y inside X” - and likewise for ‘above/below’ and ‘left-of/right-of’.
Given that the diagrammatic form of the problem has been translated into
patterns as just described, this kind of problem can be cast as a problem of
partial matching, well within the scope of SP61. To do this, symbolic repre-
sentations of item A and item B in Figure 17 are treated as a single pattern,
thus:
A small circle inside large triangle ;
B large circle above small triangle #,
and this pattern is placed in New. Four other patterns are constructed by pairing
a symbolic representation of item C (on the left) with symbolic representations
of each of D, E, F and G (on the right), thus:
C1 small square inside large ellipse ;
D small square inside large circle #
C2 small square inside large ellipse ;
E large square above small ellipse #
C3 small square inside large ellipse ;
F small circle left-of large square #
C4 small square inside large ellipse ;
G small ellipse above large triangle #
These four patterns are placed in Old, each with an arbitrary frequency value
of 1.
Figure 18 shows the best alignment found by SP61 with New and Old as
just described. The alignment is a partial match between the pattern in New
and the second of the four patterns in Old. This corresponds with the ‘correct’
result (item E) as noted above.
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13 Explaining away ‘explaining away’: IC-
MAUS as an alternative to Bayesian net-
works
In recent years, Bayesian networks (otherwise known as causal nets, influence
diagrams, probabilistic networks and other names) have become popular as a
means of representing probabilistic knowledge and for probabilistic reasoning
(see [Pearl 88]).
A Bayesian network is a directed, acyclic graph like the one shown in Figure
19 (below) where each node has zero or more ‘inputs’ (connections with nodes
that can influence the given node) and one or more ‘outputs’ (connections to
other nodes that the given node can influence).
Each node contains a set of conditional probability values, each one the prob-
ability of a given output value for a given input value. With this information,
conditional probabilities of alternative outputs for any node may be computed
for any given combination of inputs. By combining these calculations for se-
quences of nodes, probabilities may be propagated through the network from
one or more ‘start’ nodes to one or more ‘finishing’ nodes.
No attempt will be made in this article to discuss in detail how Bayesian
networks may be modelled in the ICMAUS framework or to compare the two
approaches to probabilistic inference. However, an example is presented be-
low showing how ICMAUS may provide an alternative to a Bayesian network
explanation of the phenomenon of “explaining away”.
13.1 A Bayesian network explanation of “explaining
away”
In the words of Judea Pearl [Pearl 88, p. 7], the phenomenon of ‘explaining
away’ may be characterised as: “If A implies B, C implies B, and B is true, then
finding that C is true makes A less credible. In other words, finding a second
explanation for an item of data makes the first explanation less credible.” (his
italics). Here is an example described by [Pearl 88, pp. 8-9]:
Normally an alarm sound alerts us to the possibility of a burglary. If
somebody calls you at the office and tells you that your alarm went
off, you will surely rush home in a hurry, even though there could
be other causes for the alarm sound. If you hear a radio announce-
ment that there was an earthquake nearby, and if the last false alarm
you recall was triggered by an earthquake, then your certainty of a
burglary will diminish.
Although it is not normally presented as an example of nonmonotonic rea-
soning, this kind of effect in the way we react to new information is similar to
the example we considered in Section 11 because new information has an im-
pact on inferences that we formed on the basis of information that was available
earlier.
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Alarm Phone call
announcement
Radio
Earthquake
Burglary
Figure 19: A Bayesian network representing causal relationships discussed in
the text. In this diagram, “Phone call” means “a phone call about the alarm
going off” and “Radio announcement” means “a radio announcement about an
earthquake”.
The causal relationships in the example just described may be captured in
a Bayesian network like the one shown in Figure 19.
[Pearl 88] argues that, with appropriate values for conditional probability,
the phenomenon of “explaining away” can be explained in terms of this network
(representing the case where there is a radio announcement of an earthquake)
compared with the same network without the node for ”radio announcement”
(representing the situation where there is no radio announcement of an earth-
quake).
13.2 Representing contingencies with patterns and fre-
quencies
To see how this phenomenon may be understood in terms of ICMAUS, consider,
first, the set of patterns shown in Figure 20, which are to be stored in Old.
The first four patterns in the figure show events which occur together in some
notional sample of the ‘World’ together with their frequencies of occurrence in
the sample.
Like other knowledge-based systems, an ICMAUS system would normally
be used with a ‘closed-world’ assumption that, for some particular domain, the
knowledge stored in the knowledge base is comprehensive. Thus, for example,
a travel booking clerk using a database of all flights between cities will assume
that, if no flight is shown between, say, Edinburgh and Paris, then no such flight
exists. Of course, the domain may be only ‘flights provided by one particular
airline’, in which case the booking clerk would need to check databases for
other airlines. In systems like Prolog, the closed-world assumption is the basis
of ‘negation as failure’: if a proposition cannot be proved with the clauses
provided in a Prolog program then, in terms of that store of knowledge, the
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alarm phone_alarm_call (980)
earthquake alarm (20)
earthquake radio_earthquake_announcement (40)
burglary alarm (1000)
e1 earthquake e2 (40)
Figure 20: A set of patterns to be stored in Old in an example of ‘explaining
away’. The symbol ‘phone alarm call’ is intended to represent a phone call convey-
ing news that the alarm sounded; ‘radio earthquake announcement’ represents an an-
nouncement on the radio that there has been an earthquake. The symbols ‘e1’ and
‘e2’ represent other contexts for ‘earthquake’ besides the contexts ‘alarm’ and ‘ra-
dio earthquake announcement’.
proposition is assumed to be false.
In the present case, we shall assume that the closed-world assumption applies
so that the absence of any pattern may be taken to mean that the corresponding
pattern of events did not occur, at least not with a frequency greater than one
would expect by chance.
The fourth pattern shows that there were 1000 occasions when there was a
burglary and the alarm went off and the second pattern shows just 20 occasions
when there was an earthquake and the alarm went off (presumably triggered
by the earthquake). Thus we have assumed that burglaries are much more
common than earthquakes. Since there is no pattern showing the simultaneous
occurrence of an earthquake, burglary and alarm, we shall infer from the closed-
world assumption that this constellation of events was not recorded during the
sampling period.
The first pattern shows that, out of the 1020 cases when the alarm went
off, there were 980 cases where a telephone call about the alarm was made.
Since there is no pattern showing telephone calls (about the alarm) in any other
context, the closed-world assumption allows us to assume that there were no
false positives (including hoaxes): telephone calls about the alarm when no
alarm had sounded.
Some of the frequencies shown in Figure 20 are intended to reflect the two
probabilities suggested for this example in [Pearl 88, p. 49]: ”... the [alarm] is
sensitive to earthquakes and can be accidentally (P = 0.20) triggered by one.
... if an earthquake had occurred, it surely (P = 0.40) would be on the [radio]
news.”
In our example, the frequency of ‘earthquake alarm’ is 20, the fre-
quency of ‘earthquake radio earthquake announcement’ is 40 and the fre-
quency of ‘earthquake’ in other contexts is 40. Since there is no pattern
like ‘earthquake alarm radio earthquake announcement’ or ‘earthquake ra-
dio earthquake announcement alarm’ representing cases where an earthquake
triggers the alarm and also leads to a radio announcement, we may assume that
cases of that kind have not occurred. As before, this assumption is based on the
closed-world assumption that the set of patterns is a reasonably comprehensive
representation of non-random associations in this small world.
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The pattern at the bottom, with its frequency, shows that an earthquake
has occurred on 40 occasions in contexts where the alarm did not ring and there
was no radio announcement.
13.3 Approximating the temporal order of events
In these patterns and in the alignments shown below, the left-to-right order of
symbols may be regarded as an approximation to the order of events in time.
Thus, in the first pattern, ‘phone alarm call’ (a phone call to say the alarm has
gone off) follows ‘alarm’ (the alarm itself); in the second pattern, ‘alarm’ follows
‘earthquake’ (the earthquake which, we may guess, triggered the alarm); and so
on. A single dimension can only approximate the order of events in time because
it cannot represent events which overlap in time or which occur simultaneously.
However, this kind of approximation has little or no bearing on the points to be
illustrated here.
13.4 Other considerations
Other points relating to the patterns shown in Figure 20 include:
• No attempt has been made to represent the idea that “the last false alarm
you recall was triggered by an earthquake” [Pearl 88, p. 9]. At some stage
in the development of the SP system, an attempt may be made to take
account of recency.
• With these imaginary frequency values, it has been assumed that burglar-
ies (with a total frequency of occurrence of 1160) are much more common
than earthquakes (with a total frequency of 100). As we shall see, this
difference reinforces the belief that there has been a burglary when it is
known that the alarm has gone off (but without additional knowledge of
an earthquake).
• In accordance with Pearl’s example [Pearl 88, p. 49] (but contrary to
the phenomenon of looting during earthquakes), it has been assumed that
earthquakes and burglaries are independent. If there was some associa-
tion between them, then, in accordance with the closed-world assumption,
there should be a pattern in Figure 20 representing the association.
13.5 Formation of alignments: the burglar alarm has
sounded
Receiving a phone call to say that one’s house alarm has gone off may be rep-
resented by placing the symbol ‘phone alarm call’ in New. Figure 21 shows, at
the top, the best alignment formed by SP61 in this case with the patterns from
Figure 20 in Old. The other two alignments in the reference set are shown below
the best alignment, in order of CD value and relative probability. The actual
values for CD and relative probability are given in the caption to Figure 20.
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0 phone_alarm_call 0
|
1 alarm phone_alarm_call 1
(a)
0 phone_alarm_call 0
|
1 alarm phone_alarm_call 1
|
2 burglary alarm 2
(b)
0 phone_alarm_call 0
|
1 alarm phone_alarm_call 1
|
2 earthquake alarm 2
(c)
Figure 21: The best alignment (at the top) and the other three alignments in its
reference set formed by SP61 with the pattern ‘phone alarm call’ in New and
the patterns from Figure 20 in Old. In order from the top, the values for CD
with relative probabilities in brackets are: 19.91 (0.6563), 18.91 (0.3281), 14.52
(0.0156).
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Symbol Probability
alarm 1.0
burglary 0.3281
earthquake 0.0156
Table 6: The probabilities of unmatched symbols, calculated by SP61 for the four
alignments shown in Figure 21. The probability of ‘phone alarm call’ is 1.0 because it
is supplied as a ‘fact’ in New.
The unmatched symbols in these alignments represent inferences made by
the system. The probabilities for these symbols which are calculated by SP61
(using the method described in Section 4) are shown in Table 6. These proba-
bilities do not add up to 1 and we should not expect them to because any given
alignment can contain two or more of these symbols.
The most probable inference is the rather trivial inference that the alarm
has indeed sounded. This reflects the fact that there is no pattern in Figure 20
representing false positives for telephone calls about the alarm. Apart from the
inference that the alarm has sounded, the most probable inference (p = 0.3281)
is that there has been a burglary. However, there is a distinct possibility that
there has been an earthquake - but the probability in this case (p = 0.0156) is
much lower than the probability of a burglary.
These inferences and their relative probabilities seem to accord quite well
with what one would naturally think following a telephone call to say that the
burglar alarm at one’s house has gone off (given that one was living in a part
of the world where earthquakes were not vanishingly rare).
13.6 Formation of alignments: the burglar alarm has
sounded and there is a radio announcement of an
earthquake
In this example, the phenomenon of ‘explaining away’ occurs when you learn not
only that the burglar alarm has sounded but that there has been an announce-
ment on the radio that there has been an earthquake. In terms of the ICMAUS
model, the two events (the phone call about the alarm and the announcement
about the earthquake) can be represented in New by a pattern like this:
‘phone_alarm_call radio_earthquake_announcement’
or ‘radio earthquake announcement phone alarm call’. The order of the two
symbols does not matter because it makes no difference to the result, except for
the order in which columns appear in the best alignment.
In this case, there is only one alignment (shown at the top of Figure 22) that
can ‘explain’ all the information in New. Since there is only this one alignment
in the reference set for the best alignment, the associated probabilities of the
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0 phone_alarm_call radio_earthquake_announcement 0
| |
1 alarm phone_alarm_call | 1
| |
2 earthquake alarm | 2
| |
3 earthquake radio_earthquake_announcement 3
(a)
0 phone_alarm_call radio_earthquake_announcement 0
|
1 earthquake radio_earthquake_announcement 1
(b)
0 phone_alarm_call radio_earthquake_announcement 0
|
1 alarm phone_alarm_call 1
(c)
0 phone_alarm_call radio_earthquake_announcement 0
|
1 alarm phone_alarm_call 1
|
2 burglary alarm 2
(d)
0 phone_alarm_call radio_earthquake_announcement 0
|
1 alarm phone_alarm_call 1
|
2 earthquake alarm 2
(e)
Figure 22: At the top, the best alignment formed by SP61 with the pattern
‘phone alarm call radio earthquake announcement’ in New and the patterns from Fig-
ure 20 in Old. Other alignments formed by SP61 are shown below. From the top, the
CD values are: 74.64, 54.72, 19.92, 18.92, and 14.52.
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inferences that can be read from the alignment (‘alarm ’ and ‘earthquake’) are
1.0.
These results show broadly how ‘explaining away’ may be explained in terms
of ICMAUS. The main point is that the alignment or alignments that provide
the best ‘explanation’ of a telephone call to say that one’s burglar alarm has
sounded is different from the alignment or alignments that best explain the same
telephone call coupled with an announcement on the radio that there has been
an earthquake. In the latter case, the best explanation is that the earthquake
triggered the alarm. Other possible explanations have lower probabilities.
13.7 Other possible alignments
The foregoing account of ‘explaining away’ in terms of ICMAUS is not entirely
satisfactory because it does not say enough about alternative explanations of
what has been observed. This subsection tries to plug this gap.
What is missing from the account of ‘explaining away’ in the previous sub-
section is any consideration of such other possibilities as, for example:
• A burglary (which triggered the alarm) and, at the same time, an earth-
quake (which led to a radio announcement), or
• An earthquake that triggered the alarm and led to a radio announcement
and, at the same time, a burglary that did not trigger the alarm.
• And many other unlikely possibilities of a similar kind.
Alternatives of this kind may be created by combining alignments shown in
Figure 22 with each other, or with patterns or symbols from Old, or both these
things. The two examples just mentioned are shown in Figure 23.
Any alignment created by combining alignments as just described may be
evaluated in exactly the same way as the alignments formed directly by SP61.
CDs and absolute probabilities for the two example alignments are shown in the
caption to Figure 23.
Given the existence of alignments like those shown in Figure 23, values for
relative probabilities of alignments will change. The best alignment from Figure
22 and the two alignments from Figure 23 constitute a reference set because
they all ‘encode’ the same symbols from New. However, there are probably
several other alignments that one could construct that would belong in the
same reference set.
Given a reference set containing the first alignment in Figure 22 and the
two alignments in Figure 23, values for relative probabilities are shown in Ta-
ble 7, together with the absolute probabilities from which they were derived.
Whichever measure is used, the alignment which was originally judged to rep-
resent the best interpretation of the available facts has not been dislodged from
this position.
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0 phone_alarm_call radio_earthquake_announcement 0
| |
1 alarm phone_alarm_call | 1
| |
2 burglary alarm | 2
|
3 earthquake radio_earthquake_announcement 3
(a)
0 phone_alarm_call radio_earthquake_announcement 0
| |
1 alarm phone_alarm_call | 1
| |
2 earthquake alarm | 2
| |
3 earthquake radio_earthquake_announcement 3
4 burglary 4
(b)
Figure 23: Two alignments discussed in the text. (a) An alignment created
by combining the second and fourth alignment from Figure 22. CD = 73.64,
Absolute P = 5.5391e-5. (b) An alignment created from the first alignment in
Figure 22 and the symbol ‘burglary’. CD = 72.57, Absolute P = 2.6384e-5.
Alignment Absolute Relative
probability probability
(a) in Figure 22 1.1052e-4 0.5775
(a) in Figure 23 5.5391e-5 0.2881
(b) in Figure 23 2.6384e-5 0.1372
Table 7: Values for absolute and relative probability for the best alignment in Figure
22 and the two alignments in Figure 23.
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14 Conclusion
In this article, I have outlined the concept of information compression by mul-
tiple alignment, unification and search as it has been developed in this research
program and, with examples, have tried to show how the ICMAUS paradigm
may provide a framework within which various kinds of probabilistic reasoning
may be understood. Substantially more detail about these ideas may be found
in [Wolff 98a, Wolff 98b, Wolff 98c].
This approach to understanding probabilistic reasoning seems to be suffi-
ciently promising to merit further investigation and development.
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